Ecosystem management may extend multiple use management, where economists identify and value a complex mix of ecosystem outputs. The dominant theme in conservation biology favors "safe minimum standard" (SMS) constraints on ecosystem attributes, which respond to complex and purely uncertain ecological knowledge and lead economists toward valuation questions that identify "tolerable" constraints. A hierarchical SMS constraint raises substitution possibilities among ecosystem-level components. Economists may identify unavoidable resource tradeoffs, such as in allocating land among elements of a reserve network, particularly when ecological wealth differs among geographically dispersed human communities. Economic and ecological ironies obfuscate intuitive contributions to ecosystem management policy.
science. All of these vagaries, plus the likely lon-in ecosystem management literature or in official gevity of ecosystem management in environmental policy, at least for the U.S. Forest Service, clearly policy, raise both the opportunity for and the im-identifies what condition is targeted or is acceptportance of economists as contributors to under-able: proponents advocate managing for some earstanding the implications of ecosystem manage-lier-than-modern condition of ecosystems, but this ment.
leaves an apparent arbitrariness concerning quesTherefore, my purpose here is to provide a tions as to whether this "earlier condition" relates broad overview of what ecosystem management to pre-European settlement, or simply to the conmeans to different proponents, to identify some ditions that existed in 1800, or to some other ecoapproaches that economists might consider as part logical condition. The operational objective reof ecosystem management, and to suggest some mains elusive and, in fact, may vary with the agent intuitive and inescapable concerns that economists who interprets the objective for a specific region. could elucidate to policy analysts and proponents from other fields. My intent is to provide a wide discussion of issues, yet I know that this discussion Ecosystem Management as Broader Multiple is illustrative rather than a complete enumeration Use Management of the economic issues outstanding. The paper does not attempt to provide "what is known about Economists (Mendelsohn 1995; Sedjo 1995a,b , the economics of ecosystem management"--the 1996a) have speculated that ecosystem manageanswer would be "not terribly much." Rather, this ment is simply an extension of multiple use manpaper concerns "what could or ought to become agement, by extending the traditional list of market known" about the economic implications of eco-and nonmarket goods and services-timber, range, system management. Throughout, I draw heavily wildlife, recreation, water yield, and others-to on the literature associated with management of include a measure of ecological health and quality. forest ecosystems, but the discussion applies more In this case, the role of ecologists is to provide a broadly than to forests alone.
model of what multiple outputs may derive from various management plans. The ecological model becomes a production function upon which econEcosystem Management According to Many omists build a multiple use, economic optimization model (Mendelsohn 1995) . The new ecosystem Ecosystem management is a rather vague term, but management-multiple use objective function in reviewing the literature, one concludes that its would incorporate all aspects of the ecosystem, motivation, as well as its meaning within the last including viable populations of all species, natural ten years, relates to a belief by proponents that all disturbance patterns and mechanisms, and a time use of ecosystems to provide human goods or ser-frame that allows managers to mitigate human imvices "should" be given second priority to man-pacts on an evolutionary scale. aging for the "natural condition" or "health" of Let us reflect a moment longer on the comprenthe ecosystem. For example, Grumbine offers a hensiveness of this objective. Here, the term "all working definition: species" includes not only macrofauna like birds Ecosystem management integrates scientific knowl-and mammals, but other vertebrates like reptiles edge of ecological relationships within a complex so-and amphibians, and invertebrates like insects, ciopolitical and values framework toward the general parasites, and bacteria, not to mention plant spegoal of protecting native ecosystem integrity over the cies of all sizes and roles, again including parasites long term. (1994, p. 31) and microflora (Noss and Cooperrider 1994; Windsor 1995) . In addition to a comprehensive By comparison, Noss and Cooperrider define ecosystem management as follows:
concern for biodiversity, the ecosystem management objective weighs the occurrence of natural Any land-management system that seeks to protect disturbances or simulated natural disturbances as viable populations of all native species, perpetuate well as landscape patterns and linkages among spanatural-disturbance regimes on the regional scale, tially distributed habitat types, plant community adopt a planning timeline of centuries, and allow hu-types, and successional stages or ages. man use at levels that do not result in long-term ecoIn applications analysts may fold these many logical degradation. (1994, p. 391) In applications, analysts may fold these many logicl d. ( , dimensions of ecological diversity into a single or Human uses are clearly secondary, while the small collection of convenient diversity indices whole ecosystem perspective is somewhat clear. (Holland et al. 1994; Hunter 1990; Niese and Sedjo (1995a,b, 1996a) points out that nothing Strong 1992). While simplifying the analytical task, this approach imposes a side effect that the valid in some cases, clearly violates the intent of index(es) of record may result in management bias many proponents and possibly overlooks the sciaway from ecosystem dimensions (species; land-entific rationale-or at least the rationale of misscape structural attributes) that are not well corre-sion-oriented conservation biologists. The conserlated with the chosen index(es) (Noss 1990) . Judi-vation-biological rationale for ecosystem managecious choice of the index(es) may ameliorate such ment as policy lies in a fundamental lack of faith biases because some indices may be well corre-that humans are capable of identifying and underlated, such as the correlation between bird species standing all the ecological effects of human diversity and the diversity of vertical forest struc-choices and, simultaneously, the rationale lies in a ture (MacArthur and MacArthur 1961) . However, hypothesis that loss of ecosystem health or resila focus on vertical structure deemphasizes horizon-ience may not be characterized by marginal imtal structure, which may permit managers to create pacts; catastrophic collapse of the ecosystem is hya landscape of small forest patches that are rela-pothesized as a near certainty if social decisions tively unsuitable for birds requiring expansive for-continue to ignore ecosystem health and biodiverest interiors.
sity (Arrow et al. 1995; Franklin 1989; Gillis 1990 ; Of course, this complex task is simplified fur-Holling and Meffe 1996; Noss and Cooperrider ther if ecosystem attributes may be identified as 1995 ; Stanley 1995) . This view advocates an emeither outputs providing utility or inputs needed to phasis on protection, maintenance, or restoration create desired outputs (Crocker and Tschirhart of healthy and productive ecosystems, rather than 1992; Mendelsohn 1995). Then management still emphasizing human uses, by determining conderives value from ecosystem attributes that pro-straints on decisions intended to enhance human vide no utility directly, because some of these at-welfare. tributes are critical inputs to the system. For exBecause ecology is not particularly well suited ample, mosquitoes are unlikely to provide direct to prediction, production relationships may be (positive) utility to people, yet they may have a net highly or purely uncertain, and many examples positive value derived from their role as a food exist for which well-considered management decisource to drive aesthetically pleasing acrobatics of sions created substantial unintended negative conTree Swallows (Iridoprocne bicolor).
sequences (Arrow et al. 1995 ; Holling and Meffe The view that ecosystem management simply 1996; Stanley 1995) . As a response to ubiquitous expands the multiple use objective function is uncertainty, this approach may have operational comforting and convenient. When correct, the merit in the form of constrained optimization view implies that economists need focus only on (Franklin 1989; Gillis 1990; Iverson and Alston the valuation tasks for market and nonmarket 1993; Sample 1990). A constrained optimization goods and services, although these applied valua-approach allows managers to identify goals for tion studies may need to take a more holistic ac-ecosystem attributes in the form of constraints and count of services that ecosystems provide (Berg-then evaluate the shadow cost of meeting those strom and Loomis 1995). This multiple use ap-constraints, in terms of those goods and services proach may well be valid for many applications, for which human values may be defined. The idea because legal mandates for multiple use manage-is to define ecosystem constraints in terms that are ment on public land remain in place (Flick and measurable with current knowledge and are cauKing 1995 ; Franklin 1989; Sedjo 1995b Sedjo , 1996a ; tious with respect to the uncertainties inherent in Stanley 1995) . However, there is clear policy sup-ecosystem manipulation. port for the scope of multiple use management for Given these constraints, management decisions public lands to extend across a whole ecosystem, might proceed within a "safe minimum standard" potentially well beyond the legal boundaries of framework, wherein constraints are relaxed only if public land reserves (Comanor 1994; Franklin judged to be "intolerably costly."' Bishop (1978 ) 1989 Noss and Cooperrider 1994; Sample 1994 ; attempted to motivate the safe minimum standard Sedjo 1995a,b; Swallow and Wear 1993) . This as a solution to a game theoretic problem whereby scope for ecosystem-based management raises maintaining an environmental constraint was some potentially complex issues for economists, to which we return below.
* Such an approach should not be confused with an ad hoc approach Ecosystem Management as a Constraint to multiple use management under conditions when the value of some nonmarket goods are unknown. The safe minimum standard (SMS) does
The idea that ecosystem management simply ex-not pursue management to "provide the greatest good for the greatest The idea that ecosystem management simply esnumber," as required under the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of tends the multiple use approach, while probably 1960. Rather, SMS focuses on tolerance of a constraint.
viewed as the loss-minimizing strategy in the face Randall and Farmer 1995) , an open question reof uncertainty and irreversibility. Unfortunately, mains concerning how to define "intolerably high the game theoretic foundation has been found un-cost" for a constraint. Even if we accept Randall satisfactory (Ready and Bishop 1991) , but the safe and Farmer's analysis at the global level, there minimum standard approach still offers an intuitive remains the small-scale, operational level of definappeal given concerns (Arrow et al. 1995 ; Holling ing "intolerable costs" for specific constraints apand Meffe 1996; Stanley 1995) that human deci-plied to specific attributes for specific ecosyssions without regard to ecosystem health may gen-tems.2 The question becomes "How much of a erate a sudden social-ecological collapse, rather constraint is enough to be 'safe' as well as 'tolerthan marginal decreases in quality. However, Ran-able'?" dall and Farmer (1995) recently considered the Conservation biologists may shed some light on logic (or illogic) of a choice to relax a safe mini-the safety questions, although it may require a promum standard constraint; they present one ethical fessional conjecture based on incomplete ecologiview wherein the constraint is a necessary condi-cal knowledge (Grumbine 1994; Kangas and tion for the survival of human society and wherein Kuusipalo 1993; Noss and Cooperrider 1994) . a determination that such a constraint is intolerably Economists, however, clearly offer tools to elucicostly is a revelation that society cannot survive date what are the tolerable implications of an ecosubject to the constraint, logical (safety) constraint. Economic contributions The Randall-Farmer analysis potentially renders may address the cost of a particular ecological conthe safe minimum standard concept unsuitable for straint, or "level of safety," but, with the aid of application at the relatively small (nonglobal) scale ecologists, economists may also elucidate the costof individual ecosystems or individual species. safety combinations that may be available, thereby However, upon acknowledging persistent gaps in contributing to both aspects of the question. These ecological knowledge and the absence of sufficient types of studies have already been initiated in forand uncontroversial valuation research, I believe estry applications (Holland et al. 1994 ; Niese and the idea that decisions in the face of uncertainty Strong 1992) as well as broader environmental may generate truly large (catastrophic) welfare protection applications (Fisher, Hanemann, and losses, through unanticipated ecosystem collapse, Keeler 1991) . remains intuitively reasonable. This uncertainty
In this spirit, economists may contribute several provides an appealing motivation upon which to levels of research. First, economists may trace the establish ecosystem health and resilience as a goal-cost-minimizing means of achieving a particular constraint of resource management and use. In the environmental or ecological goal. For example, face of ecological and economic uncertainty, set-Parks and Kramer (1995) estimate the cost of Conting constraints for ecosystem or landscape attrib-gressionally mandated conservation reserve tarutes may well be a rational or reasonable action gets, taking account of differing qualities of land in (Franklin 1989; Gillis 1990; Grumbine 1994 ; Noss relation to the commercial opportunity cost of preand Cooperrider 1994) .
serving that land. Cost effectiveness is an imporWe may need to view the safe minimum stan-tant piece of information, and often it is the best dard approach in a hierarchical sense, such that information that can be provided in the face of constraints operational at the individual ecosystem uncertainty concerning welfare value. However, level are viewed as disaggregated components of a analyzing cost effectiveness cannot address, for global-oriented safe minimum standard policy. That policy would be to maintain, to enhance, and to restore ecosystems' health and resilience as the example, the differential effects of the land quality enough-to identify precisely all the ecological on the benefits of maintaining that land as part of conditions that management actions might create a naturally functioning ecosystem, especially if and all the means by which ecological conditions qualities for developed uses positively correlate affect human welfare. In many cases, such selfwith the qualities for ecological services (Swallow confidence is pathological (Holling and Meffe 1994 , 1996 ). 1996 Noss and Cooperrider 1994; Stanley 1995) . Despite the absence of the benefit side, a model In those cases, economists may need to revise the to minimize the costs of meeting an ecological valuation question. constraint can provide important insights into how Rather than attempting to actually estimate ecological linkages among components of an eco-value, perhaps the question should address the issystem and interactions among management ac-sue of whether the chosen ecological constraints tions may create scale economies or identify rea-may be achieved at "tolerable costs." For examsons for rapidly increasing costs (Montgomery, ple, can economists find that it is reasonable for Brown, and Adams 1994; Paulsen and Wernstedt society to accept $13 billion in costs to manage the 1995). Where costs increase steeply, costs are northwestern ecosystem in a manner that raises the more likely to exceed benefits as managers tighten probability of Northern Spotted Owl survival from the constraint. Also, opportunities to reduce costs 91% to 95%, or do we find that society only becan be identified within the framework of a mul-lieves that $12 billion is a reasonable cost to mantiproduct firm that provides both a commercial age the ecosystem in a manner that raises the owl's product and the recovery of environmental quality survival probability from 82% to 91%?
3 Such an (hereby reducing the opportunity cost of con-approach may appear identical with the usual valstraints [Roan and Martin 1996] ).
uation question, but I intend to suggest a subtle but Finally, economists may successfully integrate important distinction. A focus on the owl may ecological realities within a cost-effectiveness serve simply to operationalize the objective of analysis, despite difficulties in bringing such real-maintaining a healthy and productive ecosystem. ities into estimation of ecological benefits. Thus, The Northern Spotted Owl may be viewed as an Montgomery, Brown, and Adams (1994) devel-"umbrella" species, the preservation of which oped an empirical model to evaluate the marginal necessarily creates a means to conserve a host of cost of increasing the probability that the northern ecosystem attributes (Noss and Cooperrider 1994, spotted owl (Strix occidentalis caurina) would ex-p. 8). These myriad ecosystem attributes may be ist for 150 years, even though valuation research-only partially described, including the owl's surers apparently needed to treat the owl's survival as vival probability and the allocation of lands bean (unrealistic) all-or-nothing proposition (Rubin, tween owl habitat and timber production. The soHelfand, and Loomis 1991).
cial valuation question may rely on an imprecise A constrained optimization approach is well appeal that management is attempting to maintain suited to the view of ecosystem management as ecosystem health and that the owl's survival is one placing human desires secondary to ecological indicator of management success. health by setting constraints on management acIn short, my suggestion is to recast the valuation tions that provide ecological goods and services of question in a manner that more explicitly considers human interest. Obviously, constrained optimiza-the safe minimum standard's requirement to define tion (especially cost minimization) cannot permit tolerable costs. We do not know, and we may an explicit balancing of ecological protection costs never know, all the ecosystem contributions to huagainst benefits, but this may not be desirable man welfare, so the question becomes one of tolwithin the reality of empirical uncertainty for both erating ecosystem constraints that are cautious in ecologists and economists (Iverson and Alston the face of pure uncertainty and, possibly, unre-1993) and the demands of decision-makers and solved issues concerning an appropriate value sysconservation advocates on economists (Bromley ter (Bengston 1994; Bergstrom and Loomis 1995; 1989 Hahn 1989) .
Randall 1994). I have not found such an approach Clearly further work, especially quantitative in the literature, but perhaps Ruitenbeek's rainforempirical research, is needed to assess the benefits est study (1992) arguably represents a step in this of ecological conditions in a holistic manner direction; that study compares the opportunity (Bergstrom and Loomis 1995). In some cases, empirical benefit estimates would allow a complete benefit cost analysis. However, such work costs of preservation with the magnitude of inter-
The strategy rejects resource tradeoffs and insists that national transfer-payments for preservation. Econwe can have the best of all possible worlds if we put omists will need to develop innovative approaches, our minds to it and are willing to reduce our resource such as ambivalence theory (Opaluch and Segerconsumption and intensity of land use for the sake of son 1989) or neoclassical approaches, as a basis to the land. (1994, p. 146) evaluate tolerable costs. evaluate tolerable costs. Economists, of course, immediately recognize that a willingness to reduce consumption is a resource tradeoff made in return for whatever goods we Producing "Ecosystem Condition" and the would receive from a healthier ecosystem, or for Relevance of Economics whatever good feelings we have about sacrifice "for the sake of the land." With due respect, one If one draws on a text, such as Noss and Cooper-is left to wonder how conservation biology and rider (1994) , to understand the conservation bio-ecosystem management actually can "reject relogical recommendations for ecosystem manage-source tradeoffs." ment, one finds a mixture of ecological science A partial answer arises in the determination of and conservation-oriented value judgment. Noss ecological constraints, as discussed above. Howand Cooperrider repeatedly emphasize that the ever, economists may be of greater service to ecoconservation of biodiversity and the restoration system management and policy by helping to idenand maintenance of healthy productive ecosystems tify where resource tradeoffs areimplicit-where are simply the ethically correct and dominant (lex-even biologists must resort to value judgment, as icographically) objectives of human interactions some conservation biology literature has begun to with ecosystems. They do recognize a role for ad-do (Hagan 1995; Kangas and Kuusipalo 1993; LeI6 dressing human preferences or economic values, and Norgaard 1996)-and when attention to rebut primarily in recognition that public relations, source tradeoffs and individual preferences can enpublic education, and political institutions may hance the goals of ecosystem management. To acprovide means to facilitate the ethically unassail-complish this, economists need a basic understandable goal. That the goal of widespread ecosystem ing of alternative strategies to produce ecosystem health and resilience may face competition for the attributes. moral high-ground is not considered (Randall 1994) . At times, conservation biologists offer Managing for Diverse and Resilient Ecosystems seemingly innocuous statements that economists may find unreasonable or extreme. may find unreasonable or extreme. Conservation biologists (Grumbine 1994; Hunter For example, Noss and Cooperrider (1994 , p. For example, Noss and Cooperrider (1994 Noss 1990; Noss and Cooperrider 1994) mercial ecosystem attributes within a landscape populations of all species in situ; (2) to represent mercial ecosystem attributes within a landscape may be enhanced by designating some zones for all native ecosystems; (3) to maintain evolutionary may be enhanced by designating some zones for and ecological processes; (4) to plan for evolutionintensive development and others for intensive protection. I , c bining t e cditi arily relevant time; and (5) to accommodate human protection. Indeed, combining these conditions use within these constraints. The approach generwith political reality motivates much of the ap-s.
T a ally attempts to reduce forest (ecosystem) fragproach to addressing the Northern Spotted Owl is-ally attempts to reduce forest (ecosystem) frag sue (Montgomery Brown, and Adams 1994) mentation so that land units may be aggregated at sueT (Montgomey B , an A s scales large enough to exhibit natural processes Noss and Cooperrider go even further as they in-bit natural processes Nrossce an Cooptegyfrordergoevenopfh as tcheysiand to protect species with unique adaptations for troduce a strategy for development of an ecosystroduce a strategf eJ o intenrior habitats free of influence from edges of ter reserve network as a central recommendation irr habitats f in nce from edges of of conservation biology: abrupt, unnatural habitat change (Franklin 1989 ; of conservation biology: Franklin and Forman 1987; Gillis 1990; Noss and Cooperrider 1994; Turner 1989 which is believed essential to the survival of many other ecosystem components, or the focal species will be an "umbrella species," the management of which will automatically protect and enhance habitats for a variety of species and processes at a r landscape scale. A focus on a keystone or umbrella species is a practical, but imperfect, approach to simplify safely the complexity of ecological attributes that command attention. Multiple use modules: building blocks for re-Core serve networks. At the landscape scale, especially in developed temperate countries, consensus recommends a network of ecological reserves manr bu aged on the concept of a "multiple use module" (Noss and Cooperrider 1994, pp. 144-61) . serve is a graduation of buffer zones in which pro-Module consists of a highly protected core regressively more intensive human use may be per-serve, of radius ro, surrounded by progressively mitted as one moves away from the core reserve. less protected buffer zones allowing greater The buffers are designed to protect the interior of multiple use, with respective buffer widths of r, the core from "unnatural" ecological processes and r 2 . that may arise from sudden changes in habitat structure. For example, Noss and Cooperrider of a cost analysis for a multiple use module are a (1994) cite a number of studies suggesting that straightforward implication of two-dimensional forest clearcuts affect microclimatic factors, such geometry. The ecological contribution of each poras wind, temperature, or moisture regimes, for up tion of the module is, as a first cut, a function of to 200 meters into a neighboring, unharvested hab-the radius of the appropriate circle, which deteritat patch, and that these factors affect ecological mines the naturalness of the core's interior and, processes such as tree mortality rates and wind-through the associated acreage, the ability of the throw. The multiple use module consists of the module to sustain natural rates of ecological discore and its buffers, with progressively more in-turbances, such as fire. The radius and acreage tensive, consumption-oriented management for would be inputs to the "production function" for multiple uses toward the outer buffer (figure 1). A constraints on biodiversity or ecological resilience reserve network, for example, consists of two or within the module. For a given ecological conmore multiple use modules that are connected ei-straint, however, the opportunity cost depends on ther by designated corridors or, if corridors are the land area (acreage) within each zone, which infeasible, by a surrounding landscape (a sur-increases with the square of the radius. In addition, rounding "matrix") in which existing land uses do cost depends on the degree of restrictions imposed not present insurmountable barriers to dispersal of on consumptive uses, with the core reserve proindividual flora and fauna between core reserves. hibiting nearly all consumptive uses and probably The geometry of the multiple use module imme-restricting recreation access, while the buffers prodiately raises resource tradeoffs for managers. The hibit progressively fewer uses. immediate question is where, geographically, to
Increasing the size of the core, through increaslocate the boundaries between a core reserve and ing its radius, entails the greatest opportunity cost its inner buffer and between the inner and outer but likely-contributes most to achieving the ecobuffers. Wear (1992), followed by Gottfried, logical diversity and resilience constraints. InWear, and Lee (1996) , identified such spatial creasing the core's radius has two implications for tradeoffs of ecosystem management as the "econ-the cost of achieving the ecological constraints. omies of configuration." Assuming a circular First, increasing the radius increases the land alloshape in this example (figure 1),6 the fundamentals cated to the core, with restrictions that impose the for units in a reserve network. They prefer a circular shape for greater The U.S. and U.N. Man in the Biosphere programs have adopted integrity of the interior habitat, while they also recommend larger cores, this strategy (David Wear 1996, personal communication) .
with connecting corridors, and relative geographic positions that enhance 6 Noss and Cooperrider (1994, pp. 138-77) discuss the optimal shapes interactions among all modules directly. See also Hof and Joyce (1992).
highest opportunity cost per acre. Second, increas-whether the values of the conservation biologist or ing the core's radius pushes the outer boundary of the values of some human constituency (the biola fixed-width buffer out further, so that the acreage ogist's private client or the public) "should" be allocated to each buffer tends to increase, increas-weighed more heavily in determining the parameing the use restrictions on additional acres. How-ters of the cost minimization problem. Below, I ever, fixed-width buffers are not required for eco-provide foundations for a preliminary rationale for logical integrity, because a larger core reserve pro-why the conservation biologist might want to use vides a self-buffering capacity for its own interior. public preferences as the basis for cost analysis. The buffers serve both to increase the area within From modules to reserve networks. A collection the core that is truly "interior forest" and to con-of one or more multiple use modules is inadequate, tribute to ecological goals, for example, by in-according to Noss and Cooperrider (1994) , for excreasing the habitat area for species that may thrive ample, to ensure a healthy and diverse ecosystem on disturbances created by multiple uses within the at regional or global scales. A consensus goal idenbuffer. We expect, therefore, that the width of the tified by Grumbine (1994) is to adopt an ecological buffers may be adjusted to some degree as the core and evolutionary time frame. This goal implies reserve increases. Then the boundaries within the ecosystem management to permit genetic exmultiple use module would be chosen so that the change between separate populations of a species marginal cost of an improvement in the appropriate and to create means by which species may alter or ecological goal (as represented, perhaps, by a bi-extend their range as long-term conditions, such as ologically determined constraint) through a change global temperature, change, and species disperse in the width of one portion of the module (figure 1) and begin to capture new ecological niches. Morewould be set equal across all portions of the mod-over, an ecosystem management goal is to preule.
serve a representative sample of all ecosystems, Noss and Cooperrider (1994) implicitly deny which cannot be accomplished with a single multhat the multiple use module approach engages in tiple use module of less than continental size. Consuch resource tradeoffs, but economists can won-servation biologists therefore recommend developder-and can demonstrate-that the choice of ment of corridors and removal of dispersal barriers boundary locations by a conservation biologist at (e.g., roads) between multiple use modules, creleast reflects the biologist's subjective balancing of ating a network of ecologically linked core rethe contributions of each zone to the ecological serves (figure 2). constraint and the political-economic feasibility of
The reserve concept adds several dimensions to implementing these boundaries. What may be a cost analysis of ecosystem management. First, more in dispute is not whether the multiple use the cost analysis would include the contribution of module requires an implicit set of tradeoffs, but the corridor to meeting ecological constraints while balancing the marginal costs of increasing again allowing reduction in the cost of particular ecosystem quality by widening the main corridor ecological constraints. boundary and its buffer zone or zones. 7 Second, and more subtle, the consideration of one or more Cost Minimization Alone Is Not Enough additional modules raises the issue of landscape scale in the calculation of the ecosystem con-In some cases, managers may consider the targeted straints.
biodiversity or ecosystem resilience constraint to The issues associated with scale arise from some be invariant to the number of modules in a reserve paradoxes or ironies of conservation biology. For network. In that case, cost minimization might alexample, Hunter (1990) and Noss and Cooperrider low a reduction in the size of individual multiple (1994) immediately acknowledge that, to maxi-use modules-the individual reserves-as a remize biodiversity at the local scale, one would in-serve network grows to represent more ecosystem elude a much higher degree of habitat fragmenta-types. However, any conservation biologist who tion and perhaps even maximize the length of remains true to the mission-oriented science would "edge" between habitats of different types, such likely advocate an increase in the level of biodias between forest patches of different ages (Frank-versity or resilience targeted for a larger network. lin and Foreman 1987; Hof and Joyce 1992). A Of course, any constraint may be chosen on the fragmented landscape pattern encourages opportu-basis of noneconomic criteria. However, at some nistic species or species that are adapted to or re-point, economists can contribute to ecosystem quire several habitat types for support. However, management through elucidating the role of public given the substantial fragmentation of the human-preferences in developing public support for ecodeveloped landscape, biologists find that most system management and how that support may de-"fragmentation-adapted" species will be common pend upon the chosen constraint. This task has at and well suited to survival in a human-impacted least two parts: identifying just what ecosystem environment. Thus, regional diversity might be management contributes to human welfare-other limited by failure to look at species composition than the traditional multiple commercial, noncombetween habitats and across regions (Noss and mercial, and aesthetic uses-and identifying Cooperrider 1994, p. 10). Reserves representing whether and how ecosystem managers might infludifferent habitat types, which support different ence the composition of those contributions to inspecies assemblages, will create greater diversity crease the public support for conservation biologat a regional scale or global scale, particularly ical goals. since core reserves would support species depenSocial science literature on what the public may dent on forest interiors, while the inner and outer gain from ecosystem management has begun to buffers provide for species adapted to progres-appear (Bingham et al. 1995 ; Brunson and Shelby sively more heterogeneous (fragmented) habitats.
1992; Gale and Cordray 1991). Already it seems From an economic perspective, the addition of clear that simply valuing biodiversity without remultiple use modules creates a number of substi-gard to species composition-counting insect spetution possibilities within a cost minimization cies the same as bird species, for example-is not framework. For a fixed ecological quality con-consistent with a qualitative understanding of pubstraint, increases in the diversity or ecological re-lic preferences (Hunter 1990; Noss and Coopersilience of one module may relax the need for con-rider 1994), nor is it consistent with how public tributions from another module. These substitution agencies have revealed their preferences via expossibilities may allow economists to consider dif-penditures on endangered species (Metrick and ferent cost-minimizing configurations of bound-Weitzman 1996). However, conservation bioloaries between the components of each module. gists propose to enroll between 25% and 75% of all Furthermore, changes in the width, length, and land in most regions in a reserve network, with character or effectiveness of corridors between some estimates reaching above 99% (Noss and modules may allow ecosystem interactions that en-Cooperrider 1994, pp. 167-72), as necessary to hance the ecosystem condition of both modules, meet conservation goals and allow for an acceptable quality of life for humans and other species. With such bold proposals, and given the unde- menting resource tradeoffs that enhance the will-ingness of the public to support creation of a re-$/acre serve system? Might the relative weight that ecosystem managers give to biodiversity and A ecosystem health be judged, validly, by a broader segment of the public than the card-carrying conservation biologists, who, after all, are responsible for enduring only part of the opportunity costs of setting "tolerable minimum standards"? Is is not true, at least, that the preferences of the public WTP 2 constitute relevant information for the decision Bl process, particularly for decisions that affect people who voluntarily contribute to conservation or TP acquiesce to conservation regulations? 8 
____I
The economic intuition here is fairly straightfor-O ward. For example, suppose society adopts a con-Q acres in straint that all ecosystem types should be repremodule 1 or 2 sented in area sufficient to prevent their endangerment. Recalling that maintenance of biodiversity Figure 3a . Egalitarian Approach may be easier with larger reserves and that different reserves may have different species assemblages (Noss and Cooperrider 1994, pp. 10, 208) , biologists might appreciate information on public preferences for each ecosystem as they determine how to balance additional investments in each.
For a simple, almost trivial, example, consider $/acre that, in a particular region, two ecosystem types A are of concern. Suppose that the cost of adding an acre to the core reserve for each ecosystem is the same and that ecological science provides no C means to judge unambiguously concerning which reserve should have more acreage. If an individual D has a relatively stronger preference for ecosystem WTP2 type 2, then their individual willingness to pay curves might be represented by the downward B sloping "demand" curves in figure 3a. Suppose ecosystem managers impose an egalitarian ap-WTP proach, placing Q acres of each ecosystem in the reserve network. Then the total willingness to pay 0 of this individual is given by the area OACQ + 1 Q Q2 acres in OABQ ( figure 3a) . In contrast, consider the case module 1 or 2 where managers take an economist's advice and add land to each reserve so that the individual's marginal willingness to pay for an additional acre Figure 3a . Under an egalitarian tive ecosystems 1 and 2 (so Qi + Q 2 = 2 · Q; approach with equal acreage in each module, figure 3 ). With the economist's approach, it is eas-total WTP is given by area OABQ + OACQ, with ily shown that the total willingness to pay area, total acreage preserved of 2 · Q. Figure 3b . Un-OAEQ 1 + OADQ 2 , exceeds the original total. This result should interest ecosystem managers ical intuition is rather direct, as follows. Ecologiin two ways. First, under the economic approach, cal stresses open opportunities for species in an the ecosystem manager has a greater potential for ecosystem to replace an existing, more dominant fundraising. Second, under the economic ap-species, and diverse ecosystems have more species proach, the manager is more likely to gain the vote "waiting" for natural or human-induced stress to of an individual for a program to set aside a given create conditions that favor its particular adaptanumber of acres (2 · Q). Either of these reasons tions. These observations mean that post-stress implies that the economic approach may foster competition between species may permanently degreater public support, thereby potentially allow-press the population of a particular species, but ing greater additions to the reserve system. that the overall biomass of the more diverse ecoBut a question remains: Why would an individ-system may be more stable. A more diverse ecoual value the two ecosystems differently? The an-system has a more stable biomass because diverswer depends on what the ecosystems and their sity increases the odds that a species is available to managers offer. For example, ecosystem 2 might fill any voids created by, for example, a drought be relatively more scenic, or better able to support that devastates a drought-intolerant species. The modest amounts of public access (user days) for result means that biodiversity aids ecosystem passive recreation. Depending on the other attrib-health and stability but may further threaten endanutes of the region, especially the matrix of land gered species. For economists, this ecological reuses outside the reserve system, individuals may search raises the question of appropriate relative simply feel their quality of life gains more from investments in holistic, ecosystem management ecosystem 2, which might represent species as-approaches versus autecological, single-species semblages that are locally uncommon but globally programs created by endangered species legislacommon.
tion. Economic research to quantify public support Of course, as economists try to elucidate the link for ecosystem reserves needs to instruct managers between public preferences and public support for on the interactions between elements of the reserve conservation, we will also need to clearly identify and public preferences. For example, regional dif-our own field's ironies. One irony, in particular, is ferences in biodiversity and the composition of lo-that a holistic approach to ecosystem valuation cal species assemblages may generate demand-side (Bergstrom and Loomis 1995) may actually lead to substitution effects. In an intertemporal setting at a less total investment in conservation, as compared local scale, these ecological and preference inter-with a series of less-holistic benefit-cost analyses actions produce wealth effects also (Swallow and (Hoehn 1991; Hoehn and Randall 1989) . Holistic Wear 1993). In addition, heterogeneity between valuation will account for substitution among difsegments of the public may generate support for a ferent sources of biodiversity or ecosystem resilmixture of programs tailored to that heterogeneity. ience, and thereby prevent unintentional overinFor example, geographic differences in local eco-vestment (from a Pareto efficiency viewpoint) in logical quality (wealth) may enhance or diminish environmental programs. Obviously, some groups the local public's support for programs pertaining may prefer this " 'Pareto' overinvestment," to certain ecosystem qualities. Also, differences in which economists would honestly reveal. preferential emphasis, such as one group desiring access to healthy ecosystems while a second group prefers managing ecosystems for minimal human Incentives and Marketing for influence, may allow managers to leverage support Ecosystem Management from both groups by managing reserve elements with different degrees of public access to the core. Such effects generate a complex analytical prob-Most discussions of ecosystem management have lem for a holistic approach to continental or global focused on public lands, but most public land ecosystem management, but economists should be boundaries were chosen for political or adminisable to shed light on how conservation biologists trative convenience rather than being based on reacould leverage public preferences to achieve their sonable ecological boundaries. For example, only goals or to make ecological constraints most toler-15% or less of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem able.
(14-19 million acres) lies within the Yellowstone Recent ecological research produced an ironic National Park (2.2 million acres), and perhaps result that also deserves notice. Tilman's (1996) only two-thirds of the ecosystem is contained freshly published "classic" (Moffat 1996) shows within public lands of any kind, including those that diverse ecosystems may well be hazardous to with intensive human uses (see Noss and Cooperthe preservation of individual species. The ecolog-rider 1994, pp. 133-38). Moreover, about 40% of major terrestrial ecosystems in the United States least in a holistic sense (rather than with a focus on are not represented in wilderness areas, and no single species). wilderness areas outside Alaska are large enough Moreover, the literature provides some evidence to support long-term populations of large carni-that the public values ecosystems not simply for vores. Obviously, if an objective of ecosystem biodiversity (Bengston 1994); rather, the public management is the preservation of representatives may be calling for a decrease in the human impact of all ecosystems, cooperation among landowners and encroachment on healthy, well-functioning across the public and private sectors is required.
ecosystems. Economists' traditional focus on Therefore, the issue of public preferences for quantities measured in numbers, like numbers of ecosystem attributes also relates directly to creat-species or acres of land preserved, may actually ing incentives for private, individual actions that misrepresent-or only partially represent-how enhance ecosystem health and for raising funds to ecosystems contribute to the public's quality of support conservation. First steps may concern mar-life. Economic and social science research may keting, while the complexities of an ecosystem di-reveal that the public's interest focuses, perhaps in vided among many landowners provide unique large part, on the degree of impact that human challenges.
society has on, for example, a continental ecosysOn the marketing side, conservation biologists tem. Appropriate units of measure may be the perhave already exploited the concept of a "flagship" centage of ecosystem types that remain represented species, whereby conservation groups promote a in the long-run, or the percentage of species that broad agenda, such as wilderness preservation, by may survive, or the percentage of "originally" focusing public attention on a particularly attrac-forested land that has been permanently cleared. tive, aesthetically pleasing species like caribou The quantities of resources, such as land area, that (Rangifer spp.) or the Northern Spotted Owl (Noss ecosystem management commits to preservation or and Cooperrider 1994, p. 8).10 Marketing to gain restricted human use will clearly determine the oppublic financial support or favorable voter behav-portunity cost of producing the desired ecosystem ior instead may focus on "umbrella" or "keycondition, but the "ecosystem product" that is stone" species, by identifying the associated spe-provided may require measurement in less convencies assemblages and ecosystem attributes that tional terms. may be preserved along with the umbrella or key-
The issue then becomes one of identifying the stone species. This approach is more consistent public value of desirable land management acwith ecological priorities. Economists may help tions, from an ecosystem management viewpoint, identify the public's willingness to support pro-and then creating mechanisms for bringing these grams associated with ecologically consistent mar-values into the incentive structure of individual keting and identify the conservation advantages of landowners. Burton (1996) recently proposed a the trust that such an approach develops in the mechanism by which "environmentalists" and public (cf. Swallow et al. 1995) .
"industry" can be brought together to truthfully There is a rapidly growing literature on creating reveal their relative preferences for alternative land mechanisms by which private individuals and uses, leading directly to incentives to improve the firms may gain or generate incentives to manage efficiency of land-use. While his framework anticecosystem resources for biological diversity. Sev-ipates that the "environmentalists" may reject the eral studies have contributed to developing a ratio-traditional approach of translating aesthetic values nal framework for evaluating the composition of to monetary terms, Burton's promising approach species assemblages, rather than simply giving all awaits extension to the spatial and temporal conspecies and taxonomic ranks equal weight in a "di-text within which substitution and wealth effects versity index" (Polasky and Solow 1995; Solow, may arise from geographic and temporal differPolasky, and Broadus 1993; Weitzman 1992, ences in ecosystem attributes or biodiversity. 1993). Unfortunately for ecosystem preservation,
In the forestry literature, several authors have there is some indication that the commercial value initiated discussion on whether regulation of priof biodiversity, at the margin, may be small vate land or a system of market incentives would (Simpson, Sedjo, and Reid 1996;  Simpson and involve the least transaction costs for the greatest Sedjo 1996). However, the nonmarket value of gain from landowner cooperation. The tentative biodiversity remains a largely unexamined area, at conclusion, without empirical support, is that regulations may be costly to implement and enforce, while incentives-even if imperfect-may leave '" The "flagship" species may also allow conservation groups to landowners with a greater degree of trust in v enlist the Endangered Species Act as a strong legal framework to pursue landowners wth a greater degree of trust i go broad conservation goals.
emment's protection of their rights to make land use choices (Gottfried, Wear, and Lee 1996; Sam-sion of "ecological condition" might make unnecpie 1994; Wear 1992). For example, landowners essary costs associated with government may fear that regulation will increase the likeli-intervention via either regulatory or incentive strathood that government will identify the individual's egies; public lands could provide for ecological land as "critical habitat which should never be health and resilience while private lands could proharvested," causing the landowner either to face vide market goods, and the overall costs of achievsubstantial bureaucratic inconvenience or to forgo ing the ecosystem objective might be lower than desired management options. This fear may create with an approach that attempts to coordinate manstrong political opposition to a regulatory ap-agement of many public and private land units. proach, opposition that may not be so severe for an However, because "gap analysis" (Noss and incentives approach. However, some incentives Cooperrider 1994, pp. 133-38) shows that 40% of approaches may also generate political-economic U.S. ecosystem types remain unrepresented in wilopposition. For example, implementation of na-derness reserves, conservation biologists will tional or international "eco-labels," which certify likely seek cooperation from private landowners to consumers that wood products derive from for-and nonwilderness agencies. est land under ecologically sensitive management, Currently, however, the literature provides no raises concerns among landowners that "environ-empirical estimates of the costs of government inmentalists" may capture certification organiza-tervention, for either regulatory or incentives aptions and impose unreasonable (or intolerable) proaches, for comparison with the opportunity standards that ultimately disadvantage landowners costs of achieving any particular constraint on eco- (Linddal 1996; Sullivan 1996 ; personal observa-system condition." Such a comparison awaits detion).
velopment of a framework for exploring means to Importantly, this literature has also raised the gain landowner cooperation within, for example, a concern that land use restrictions in one region multiple use module. may generate demands for commercial products
The example illustrated in figure 4 provides from another region, thereby exporting human-some indication of the complexity of economic iscaused ecosystem stresses from the first region to sues that the multi-landowner context raises. In the second (Lippke and Oliver 1993) . Murray and this example, I assume that the multiple use mod- , for example, show that owl manage-ule is centered on a core reserve that a public ecoment may have reduced harvest from the Pacific system manager (conveniently) controls, but that Northwest by about 4.25 billion board-feet be-the inner and outer buffers may be divided among tween 1988 . Sedjo (1996b provides ev-several private owners (or commodity-oriented idence that the management plan for the Northern public agencies). I also assume, for convenience, Spotted Owl did indeed export demand for com-that landowner boundaries do not cross boundaries mercial extraction to other portions of the global between the core reserve and its inner buffer or ecosystem.
between the two buffers. This illustration permits a Landowners within the multiple use module. discussion of interactions among land parcels, Policy and economic research is nearly absent con-based on both the geographic and the temporal cerning the development of regulations or incen-linkages among parcels. As previously discussed, tives designed specifically to gain landowner co-conservation biologists recommend that lands operation in ecosystem management. One reason within the inner buffer (parcels 1-4) be managed is the historic focus on multiple use management for less-intensive multiple uses, because of their that targeted lands under public ownership (Bowes location next to the core reserve. However, the and Krutilla 1989; Wear, Turner, and Flamm ecosystem manager likely must offer incentives if 1996). Many of the multiple use approaches do not these landowners are asked to voluntarily reduce fully recognize spatial and intertemporal linkages their commercial timber harvests by 50 to 100%. across management units within a forest ecosystem Familiar approaches, such as tax credits or conser-(Hof and Joyce 1992; Swallow and Wear 1993). vation-reserve programs, will require evaluation More recent concern for the whole ecosystem, re- (Lippke and Oliver 1993; Sample 1994) . gardless of management boundaries, generates However, economists could propose newer, innew attention to the configuration of public lands novative approaches, such as public-private coopand their linkage to private land (Albers 1996; Swallow and Wear 1993; Swallow, Talukdar, and Wear in press; Wear 1992) . Wear (1992) and GottWear in press; Wear 1992). Wear (1992) and GottAs already noted above, the nonmarket benefits of a given ecosysfried, Wear, and Lee (1996) suggest the possibility tem condition remain unknown, so I have made this statement only as a that specializing public lands toward the provi-comparison of costs.
harvests. In such a case, managers may have even more flexibility to negotiate cooperative agreements with private landowners, since a higher extraction rate may be permissible to swap for cooperation.
The economics of this situation remains unad- Albers (1996) Economists usig game theory may contribute to developing policies or approaches to establish margin of public land becomes part of the innerg or roaches to establish buffer.
landowner cooperation within ecosystem management. 2 Such research would draw on the economics of nonindustrial private forestry (e.g., Boyd eratives, perhaps modeled on the idea of a "con-1984; Hyberg and Holthausen 1989; Koskela servation district." For example, if the core re-1989; Kuuluvainen, Karppinen, and Ovaskainen serve is reasonably large, then public managers 1996; Kuuluvainen and Salo 1991; Max and Lehmight gain some ecological advantage by allowing man 1988) in an effort to identify approaches to the outermost portion of the publicly owned center leverage the value that these landowners may place to be managed as a part of the inner buffer (dashed on noncommercial services from their forest land. boundary in figure 4) . Such a decision raises the Newman and Wear (1993) show that nonindustrial tradeoffs implicit in choosing the boundary be-private forest owners place a value on standing tween the core and the inner buffer. However, an timber stock that exceeds the value revealed by innovative definition of the core's boundary might industrial forest owners, indicating a potential openable managers to grant some extraction rights to portunity for bargaining by ecosystem managers. landowners within the main inner buffer in ex-For example, such a differential raises an opporchange for the landowners' agreement to manage tunity for managers to gain control of "harvest their parcels in a manner consistent with the eco-rights" to some private parcels for an opportunity system management plan. Such an arrangement cost that falls below the market value of standing would allow the ultimate core reserve to exist timber. However, Provencher and Swallow (1995) within a more effective inner buffer, as compared indicate that if landowners have access to ecosyswith the situation where landowners within the tem resources on neighboring parcels, they may be buffer refuse to cooperate. Moreover, the approach less inclined to forego income from commercial may provide local managers, who may hold loca-harvests in order to enhance noncommercial values tion-specific expertise, to achieve more specialized from their land. These studies all raise complicated control without the political-economic challenges challenges for the application of game theory to associated with explicit tax or subsidy approaches. ecosystem management in general, and reserve Furthermore, in some case, public land may ex-networks in particular. tend, for example, to a portion of the outer buffer or to the land-use matrix surrounding the module. In these locations, ecosystem management would 12 Piyali Talukdar is nearing completion of a dissertation based on a allow more intensive uses, like commercial timber game theoretic approach.
Summary
gests how ecosystem managers may manipulate the design of a reserve system in order to enhance This paper provides an overview of ecosystem the public's financial or political support for a parmanagement and economic issues motivated by ticular ecosystem management program or for traditional multiple use management and by con-more aggressive goals. servation biologists. While ecosystem manageEconomists can also analyze geographic or spament may be viewed appropriately as an extension tial issues in ecosystem management. For examof multiple use management for many managers, pie, the analysis suggests that the opportunity cost the dominant theme in the literature of conserva-of allocating an additional acre to a core reserve tion biology seems consistent with setting con-derives not only from the opportunities forgone straints on ecosystem attributes and allowing hu-because of restrictions on land use in the core, but man activity within those constraints. If ecosystem also from the concomitant allocation of land to management is viewed as an extension of multiple buffer zones, which imposes opportunity costs on use, then economists may focus attention on pro-owners of those acres. Furthermore, development viding a complete valuation of the mix of outputs of a reserve network will raise possible substitution included in the extended objective function. Such and wealth effects associated with the geographic an approach is convenient for an economist's pre-differences in biodiversity supported by each muldisposition to identify efficient management strat-tiple use module. These effects raise the potential egies, but it overlooks the complexity of first iden-for managers to meet a given standard or constraint tifying and then valuing all the ecosystem attrib-while reducing costs or restrictions on some eleutes that may be relevant.
ments of the reserve network. Furthermore, the Facing complexity and uncertainty of ecological geographic differences in biodiversity endowments knowledge, managers operationalize goals for eco-may interact with public preferences to alter the system attributes as constraints on the production willingness of different human communities to of goods and services for humans. This view leads support ecosystem management objectives, and toward the economics of a safe minimum standard, economic research could identify these interacincluding the possibility that economists might re-tions. vise their emphasis on benefits and begin to emAn open area for future research remains the phasize how tight a constraint society considers development of institutions, regulations, or incen-"tolerable." Of course, Randall and Farmer tives to cause individual and independent landown-(1995) argue that a safe minimum standard applies ers to cooperate with ecosystem managers. Existonly for global-or continental-scale policies. In ing literature debates whether regulatory or incenthat case ecosystem-level constraints represent dis-tives approaches would be less costly means for aggregated components of the safe minimum stan-government intervention to inject scarce ecosystem dard. As components of a larger constraint policy, attributes within individual decisions, but applied substitution possibilities exist among the ecosys-evaluation is nonexistent. A consensus exists that tem-level constraints.
new institutional mechanisms should leverage the The paper also reviews the insistence by conser-advantages of local managers, who can develop vation biologists that valid ecosystem management detailed knowledge of local ecosystems and who necessarily rejects resource tradeoffs. In the con-can respond more rapidly to changing circumtext of establishing a network of ecological re-stances. serves, designed on the concept of multiple use Economists may identify new roles for public modules, the review shows that resource tradeoffs land in some institutions that encourage landowner are unavoidable. Economists may contribute to cooperatives-or ecosystem conservation disecosystem management by identifying where tricts-to form multiple use modules. Our public tradeoffs occur and by characterizing the tradeoffs land system leaves substantial gaps relative to the implicit in the management choices. Cost minimi-conservation biologist's ideal distribution of rezation identifies tradeoffs implicit in establishing serves. However, economic research could idenreserve cores and buffer zones, and economists tify mechanisms that leverage the comparative admay base cost minimization on ecologically sound vantage of all existing public lands. In some cases, models even when ecological uncertainty makes public land would be redesignated as a core rebenefit analysis controversial. Also, the relation-serve. In other cases, public land could be used to ship between cost and constraints may elucidate a gain the cooperation of independent landowners "tolerable" constraint. In addition, when analysis within a particular multiple use module, possibly of public preferences is feasible, economists may by opening some areas of public land to commercast results within a framework that sug-cial activities of cooperating landowners. Using
